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Why Restate the Bundle?
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY
Thomas W. Merrill† & Henry E. Smith††
INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute (ALI) has devoted a great
deal of time and energy to restating the law of property. To
date, the ALI has produced 17 volumes that bear the name
First, Second, or Third Restatement of Property. There is
unquestionably much that is valuable in these materials. On
the whole, however, the effort has been a disappointment.
Some volumes seek faithfully to restate the consensus view of
the law; others are transparently devoted to law reform. The
ratio of reform to restatement has increased over time, to the
point where significant portions of the Third Restatement
consist of repudiating what was done in the First and Second
Restatements,1 which can hardly inspire confidence. Most
damning of all, the effort to restate the law of property remains
seriously incomplete. Even after 17 volumes produced over 75
years, the Restatement of Property offers no treatment of
adverse possession, ignores most of the law of personal
property, says nothing about real estate transfers, recording
acts, groundwater and mineral rights, or eminent domain, and
does not touch intellectual property. The incompleteness
reduces the utility of these Restatements as a research tool,
and diminishes the incentive of lawyers to draw upon them.
Recent data on the usage of different Restatements
confirm the relative weakness of the Restatement of Property.2
Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1 The THIRD RESTATEMENT repudiates the SECOND’s version of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, which in turn repudiated the version in the FIRST RESTATEMENT, see infra
notes 48-66 and accompanying text; and the THIRD RESTATEMENT repudiates the FIRST
RESTATEMENT’s version of servitudes, see infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
2 We are grateful to Lance Liebman, Executive Director of the ALI, for
providing us with this information.
†

††
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The ALI receives royalty payments for downloads of its
Restatements by users of Westlaw. The Restatement of Property
generates only one-quarter the royalties generated by the
Restatement of Contracts, and merely 15% of the royalties of
the Restatement of Torts. Of course, it is possible that the law
of property is contested less frequently than contracts or torts.
But the Restatement of Property is downloaded even less than
the Restatement of Trusts, which could be regarded as a
subfield of property. The data on usage tend to confirm, in our
opinion, that lawyers and scholars find the Restatement of
Property unhelpful compared to many of the other restatement
efforts undertaken by the ALI.3
The failure of the Restatement of Property, at least
relative to Contracts, Torts, Trusts, and a number of other
subjects, raises important questions for the ALI and property
scholars alike. In this essay we explore the possible causes of
that failure. To a certain extent, it can be explained by
accidents of history. As we describe in Part I, the Restatement
of Property was conceived in extremely broad terms, so broad
that it was probably unrealistic to expect that it could be
completed. The property project has also been dominated by
Reporters whose interests have been focused narrowly on
particular subsets of the law of property, at the expense of the
general law of property. Perhaps most critically, the Second
and Third Restatements of Property have been given over to
campaigns for legal reform, often entailing the repudiation of
earlier volumes of the Restatement, which has very likely
undermined the utility and the credibility of the ALI’s effort.
We nevertheless argue that the roots of the failure of
the Restatement of Property run deeper. As detailed in Part II,
the Restatement of Property was launched as a deliberate effort
to inject greater rigor and clarity into legal analysis by
adopting the “scientific” terminology of Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld. Chapter 1 of the First Restatement of Property could
be described as a Restatement of Hohfeld. This effort failed, as
other Reporters were either hostile or indifferent to the
program of adopting the Hohfeldian vocabulary.
This does not mean, however, that the Hohfeldian
legacy is irrelevant. As we argue in Part III, Hohfeld’s analysis
3 Another comparison, which we have not attempted to quantify, is to the
relative frequency with which Restatements are referenced in leading casebooks. It is
our impression that the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS and the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
appear much more frequently in contracts and torts casebooks than does the
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY in property casebooks.
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of legal concepts was associated with a substantive theory of
property as a formless and infinitely malleable collection of
rules to be shaped in accordance with ad hoc perceptions of
public policy. This substantive theory has come to be associated
with the metaphor of the “bundle of rights” or “bundle of sticks.”
The theory of property as a plastic concatenation of rules has
animated the restatement project from its beginnings to the
present day. Yet if this substantive theory is correct, it is unclear
why it makes any sense to devote significant intellectual energy
to trying to restate the law of property. Existing rules are likely to
be the product of policy imperatives of the distant past,
perpetuated by path dependency, which are largely irrelevant to
today’s world. It would be far better to devote one’s energies to
reforming the law, in order to make it coincide with today’s policy
preferences. This, we think, describes the fate of the
Restatement of Property. Its failure lies in significant part in
the theory of property that launched it and that has been
adhered to ever since.
I.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

We begin with a brief review of the history of the
Restatement of Property. That history reveals at least some of
the sources of the relative weakness of the Restatement of
Property. Contrary to Hegel, history is more than the unfolding
of the implications of an Idea. Interests, personalities, and
simple accidents also matter.
Planning for the Restatement of Property began in 1926,
when the ALI Executive Committee asked Harry A. Bigelow of
the University of Chicago to prepare a report dealing with “the
Scope and Classification of the Subject of Property.”4 Bigelow
responded with a 70-page memo setting forth a blueprint for
the anticipated project.5 The memo began with a discussion of
the meaning of property, which Bigelow defined in extremely
broad terms. Property, he stipulated, refers to the rights of
persons with respect to “things,” both tangible and intangible,
which other persons have a duty to respect.6 As defined,
“property” included not just rights to land and chattels, but
also security interests, choses in action, personal contracts,
4 HARRY A. BIGELOW, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON SCOPE AND
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT “PROPERTY” 2 (A.L.I. 1926) (hereinafter Bigelow
Memo) (reproducing resolution).
5 Id. at 3-4.
6 Id. at 5-6.
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intellectual goods, enforceable promises, and even reputations.7
The potential domain of property, he concluded, is very broad.
Bigelow then proceeded to exclude from this broad
universe various topics that by convention were regarded as
discrete fields of study. Thus, although the definition was so
broad that it included contracts, Bigelow acknowledged that
contracts should be excluded because they would be subject to a
separate projected Restatement of Contracts.8 Similarly, although
his definition included intangible rights like reputation, Bigelow
acknowledged that this should be covered in the Restatement of
Torts.9 Although Bigelow regarded trusts as being more
comfortably nested within the field of property, he also
recommended that trusts be the subject of a separate
Restatement, given that trusts were studied by scholars who
specialized in that subject and were not generalists in the field
of property.10 (George Bogart, a trusts specialist and one of
Bigelow’s colleagues at Chicago, assisted Bigelow in preparing
the memo.11) Equity presented a particular puzzle, and Bigelow
devoted considerable space to considering whether topics like
specific performance of land sale contracts should be included
in a Restatement of Property or in a Restatement of Equity, a
task complicated by uncertainty over whether there was to be a
Restatement of Equity.12 (No such restatement was ever
produced, although the ALI did sponsor a path-breaking
Restatement of Restitution.13)
Viewed from a distance, Bigelow’s memo was a classic
power grab: claim authority over everything and then concede
away discrete subjects where others have staked out turf and
would resist encroachment. It worked, in the sense that the
Council tacitly endorsed Bigelow’s effort and appointed him
Reporter for the Restatement of Property. The strategy was also
to have decisive effects on the future shape of the restatement
project. It explains, for example, why wills and estates are
included under the umbrella of the Restatement of Property,
whereas trusts are subject to a separate Restatement, even
Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 8-9.
9 Id. at 9-10.
10 Id. at 31-32.
11 Id. at 2 (noting Bogart’s participation). Bogart later served on the Advisory
Committee for the First RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS
iii (1935), and, of course, has his name on a prominent treatise devoted to trusts.
12 Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 28-42.
13 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS (1937). Warren A. Seavey and Austin W. Scott served as reporters.
7
8
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though, from the perspective of modern legal practice and law
school curricula, it would make more sense to cover both topics
in a single Restatement, e.g., “Trusts and Estates.” Both wills
and trusts fell within Bigelow’s broad definition of “property,”
but trusts were specifically hived off, whereas wills and estates
were not.
Bigelow’s memo was equally fateful in his discussion of
the order in which topics within the field of property should be
taken up by the projected Restatement. He argued that the
first thing to tackle was estates in land and future interests.14
Only later would the restaters turn to the legal incidents of
ownership, servitudes, personal property, and intellectual
property.15 This ordering of priorities goes a long way toward
explaining the incompleteness of the Restatement of Property, and
especially the heavy emphasis on land at the expense of personal
and intangible rights. Estates in land came first, and the ALI
never got around to restating much of what Bigelow slated for
coverage at a later time.
One suspects that Bigelow’s priorities were strongly
influenced by the law school curriculum of the 1920s, which
made the estate system derived from English feudalism the
centerpiece of the study of property.16 Interestingly, however,
Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 63-64.
Id. at 61-64
16 These proclivities can be illustrated in instructional materials prepared by
Bigelow and Powell, separately and jointly. In his 1919 casebook on real property,
Bigelow’s table of contents consisted of: Chapter I “The Feudal System,” Chapter II
“Estates,” Chapter III “Nonposessory Interests in Land,” Chapter IV “Joint
Ownership,” Chapter V “Disseisin and the Remedies Therefor.” 2 HARRY A. BIGELOW,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1919); see also 2 HARRY A. BIGELOW &
JOSEPH WARREN MADDEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.
1934). Later, Bigelow and Powell, together with Ralph Aigler, published a famous
casebook, RALPH A. AIGLER, HARRY A. BIGELOW & RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY (Warren A. Seavey ed., 1942), whose Parts are: 1
“Personal Property,” 2 “Types of Estates in Land,” 3 “Relations Involving Two or More
Owners of Property,” 4 “Adverse Possession and Prescription,” 5 “Problems in
Conveyancing.” Part 1, apparently by Bigelow (who had previously published a
casebook on personal property), engages in a Hohfeldian analysis of the legal protection
of an owner’s interests in a car, with citations to Hohfeld, Corbin, and Kocourek. Id. at
2-3. (Later in Chapter 1, a position is staked out that “all legal relations can exist only
between persons, the legal relations that constitute the law of property concern
things . . . but a thing cannot have a legal relation.” Id. at 3-4. In contrast to some of
Bigelow’s statements during the ALI process, the book goes on to develop a general
account of property as entailing rights good against the world, stating that
14
15

[t]he second characteristic [of property] is that the four relations discussed in
the preceding paragraphs are all relations between A and an indefinitely
large number of persons, or as it is sometimes put, “against the world at
large,” or to use a common but, for the reasons just discussed, misleading
Latin phrase, “in rem.”
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Bigelow sought to justify his ordering of topics in a very
modern way, by generating an empirical study of the relative
frequency with which different topics in property law appear in
reported judicial decisions. The empirical study, he suggested,
supported his recommendation to tackle real property and the
estate system first.17 Yet an examination of his data, reproduced
in an appendix to the memo, casts doubt on this.18 Even in the
1920s, mortgages and liens generated more litigation than
estates; for that matter, so did personal property disputes (even
after excluding cases involving sales) and landlord-tenant law.19
Today, of course, the topic Bigelow put at the forefront has
declined greatly in significance, and the ones he put off to the
future have emerged as having even greater importance than
they had in his day. Rigorous adherence to empiricism would
have produced a sequencing of topics for the projected
Restatement much more consistent with future trends.
Perhaps most significantly, Bigelow’s ambitious agenda
sowed the seeds of failure. The projected scope of the project was
so broad that it would take a herculean effort to bring it to
conclusion. Perhaps Bigelow was Hercules, but we will never
know, for he resigned his position as Reporter after only two
years, upon being appointed Dean of the University of Chicago
Law School.20 His replacement was Richard R. Powell, of
Columbia Law School, who had also advised on the planning
memo and was a member of the original Advisory Committee
on Property.21
Powell was a natural choice to take over as Reporter. He
was deeply learned and widely respected in his field.
Nevertheless, he did not have the temperament needed to execute
Bigelow’s ambitious program. Powell’s scholarship was
Id. at 4. (contrasting this “marked characteristic of property” with the situation in
contract); see also id. at 5 (generalizing the analysis to real property). Part 2,
apparently by Powell, includes not only Chapter 7 “Historical Background” but also
Chapter 14 “Equitable Estates—Uses Prior to 1536”! Id. at 561. To cite another
example, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the West Publishing Company published
five volumes on Property Law by Columbia Law School professors for use in the first
year curriculum. See RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
POSSESSORY ESTATES (West. Pub. Co. 1933). They were an introductory volume on
“Possessory Estates,” two volumes on “Trusts and Estates,” a volume on “Vendor and
Purchaser,” and a volume on “Landlord and Tenant.” Id. at v-vii. All five volumes dealt
almost exclusively with real property. Id.
17 Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 14.
18 Id. App. at 74-75. The survey was comprised of all reported cases digested
in the American Digest, Volume 22-A, covering the first four months in 1925.
19 Id.
20 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, vol I, introduction x (1936).
21 Id. at xi.
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characterized by an insistence on “meticulous accuracy.”22 He was
also fascinated by details rooted in English history. Biographical
sketches of his years at Columbia feature his mastery of the
Socratic teaching method, including an exchange in which he
asked a student to explain “[w]hat effect did the Statute of Quia
Emptores have upon the creation of tenancies in frankalmoign?”23
Powell’s announced intention, upon taking over as Reporter, was
to avoid misleading generalities and “particularize extensively,”
although he admitted that this “has the disadvantage of
restricting the immediate aid rendered by the Institute to quite
narrow fields in the Law of Property.”24 Powell was neither a
theorist nor a reformer by temperament. He recognized that the
law evolved, but it did so slowly, and in order to understand the
law one had to start with history. Although it would be
inaccurate to characterize Powell as a legal formalist of the sort
associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell, he
unquestionably regarded the restatement enterprise as one in
which the committee’s task was to uncover the superior “rule”
implicit in existing legal sources.
This rule-based and historically-grounded orientation is
highly visible in the first four volumes of the Restatement
produced under Powell’s supervision. Perhaps the most telling
example is Chapter 5, for which Powell was solely responsible,
which spends 127 pages explicating “Fees Tail and Related
Estates.”25 The fee tail had been abolished in virtually every
state for over one hundred years when the Restatement was
prepared. The chapter is therefore devoted to explicating the
estates into which the fee tail was converted under different
statutes in different states, and the case law interpreting these
statutes. The result was definitive. But given the obscurity of the
topic, its fundamental irrelevance, and the impossibility of stating
a single rule for all jurisdictions, this was surely a misplaced
commitment of resources for a Restatement, especially given all
the other items waiting on Bigelow’s agenda.
Whether it was due to the change in leadership, or to
Powell’s insistence on a meticulous elaboration of the old estate
22 John Ritchie, III, Book Review, 63 HARV. L. REV. 732, 734 (1950)
(reviewing RICHARD R. POWELL, I THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1949)).
23 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY 268 (1955); see also Text of the Resolution of the Columbia University
Faculty of Law in Honor of Richard Roy Belden Power on the Occasion of his
Retirement, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 105 (1960).
24 Richard R. Powell, Restatement of the Law of Property, 16 A.B.A. J. 197,
198 (1930).
25 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 59-106 (1936).
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system, the Restatement of Property soon lagged badly behind
other restatement efforts. The first two volumes did not appear
in print until 1936, well after Agency, Contracts, Torts, and
other efforts had made their initial debut.26 At some point in
the mid-1930s, William Draper Lewis, the Executive Director
of the ALI, became alarmed. In 1935, the decision was made to
transfer a group of property specialists working on the legal
incidents of ownership, under the leadership of Everett Fraser of
the University of Minnesota Law School, from the Restatement of
Property to the Restatement of Torts.27 This explains why a
collection of topics denominated “natural rights in land”—
including nuisance, lateral and subjacent support, and riparian
water rights—appears in Volume IV of the Restatement of Torts,
rather than in the Restatement of Property.
By the time Powell delivered the first two volumes of
the Restatement of Property in 1936, a further decision was
made to subdivide the property working group. Powell would
continue to lead “Group 1,” explicating the constructional
principles that govern estates in land and future interests and
the Rule Against Perpetuities. A new “Group 2,” under the
leadership of Oliver Rundell of the University of Wisconsin Law
School, would tackle servitudes.28 Powell delivered his third
volume, on constructional principles, in 1940, and a fourth and
final volume, on the Rule Against Perpetuities and related
restrictions on the creation of property interests, in 1944.
Rundell also completed the work on servitudes in 1944.29 After
that, World War II ended the original restatement project.
Although Torts and Contracts were relatively complete efforts,
the Restatement of Property covered only estates in land and
servitudes. If one looked into the Restatement of Torts, one
could find significant additional material relevant to property,
including a fairly complete treatment of the right to exclude and
privileges overriding the right to exclude30 and the incidents of
26 Volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS appeared in
1932; volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY appeared in 1933;
volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS appeared in 1934; the
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW appeared in 1934; and volumes 1 and 2 of
the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS appeared in 1935.
27 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS vii, intro. (1939)
28 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, vol 1, introduction xiii (1936).
29 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: FUTURE INTERESTS CONTINUED AND
CONCLUDED (1940); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SOCIAL RESTRICTIONS
IMPOSED ON THE CREATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS (1944); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (1944).
30 Volume I of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS includes very extensive
coverage of basic rights in property and exceptions thereto. Chapter 7, covering 40
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ownership covered by Fraser’s ad hoc group transferred from
Property to Torts. But the balance of Bigelow’s ambitious agenda,
including landlord-tenant, mortgages and liens, all of personal
property, and intellectual property went untouched.
When the ALI decided to revive the Restatement of
Property project in 1970, Powell was again appointed to the
advisory committee, but the position of Reporter went to A.
James Casner of Harvard Law School.31 Casner was a protégée
of Powell’s, having obtained a J.S.D. degree from Columbia
under Powell’s supervision while a young scholar on leave from
Maryland Law School. Powell was sufficiently impressed by his
student that he had Casner appointed to the Advisory
Committee for the Restatement of Property, where he worked on
Chapter 7, which dealt with class gifts (the topic of his
dissertation), and prepared the index for volumes I and II.32
Casner made important contacts as the junior member of the
advisory committee, especially in developing a close friendship
with Barton Leach of Harvard Law School. Leach later secured
Casner a visiting professorship at Harvard, which turned into
an offer of tenure.33 After serving as an intelligence officer in
World War II, Casner returned to Harvard. He and Powell
briefly discussed collaborating on a property treatise, but
Powell decided to develop a treatise on his own, which still bears
his name.34 Casner then put together a team of authors to produce
the American Law of Property, which was effectively a competing
treatise to Powell’s.35 Casner and Leach also collaborated on a
popular property casebook.36 Casner maintained close ties with
pages, covers “Invasions of the Interest in the Exclusive Possession of Land and its
Physical Condition (Trespass on Land)”; Chapter 8, covering 149 pages, deals with
“Privileged Entries on Land”; Chapter 9, covering 88 pages, treats “Intentional
Invasions of Interests in the Present and Future Possession of Chattels”; and Chapter
10, covering 46 pages, addresses “Privileges Intentionally to Invade Interests in
Present and Future Possession of Chattels.” This material is covered in only the most
cursory fashion in torts casebooks today and the material is more likely to be
encountered in basic property law courses.
31 The information on Casner and his tenure as Reporter of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY has been gleaned from an historical video interview with Casner
produced by the ALI in 1990. ALI Audiovisual History—A. James Casner, (A.L.I. 1990),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTH1q5B_1nk&list=PL1C004D53890D3AA1.
32 Id. at 02:03-06:25; 24:20-24:28.
33 Id. at 09:30-14:47.
34 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1949). The
current edition, a loose-leaf treatise published in 17 volumes, is Powell on Real
Property (Michael Allen Wolf, general ed., 2013).
35 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
36 A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (1st
ed. 1950).
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the ALI during this period, serving as Reporter for a Restatement
of Estate and Gift Taxation before also being appointed the new
Reporter for Property.37
Casner lacked Bigelow’s theoretical bent, and did not
share Powell’s scholarly fascination with historically-derived
rules. He was, by temperament, a reformer. Casner had stirred
up the tax bar with his proposal for a one-time generationskipping tax based on life expectancies as part of his work on
estate and gift taxes.38 When asked for his advice about how to
proceed with a new restatement of property, Casner argued that
the first task should be landlord-tenant law.39 He reasoned,
sensibly enough, that the First Restatement had said virtually
nothing about this area of property law. But he was also
motivated by the awareness that landlord-tenant law was a hot
topic at the time among those agitating for legal reform to
assist the poor, and he saw the Restatement as a means for
lending weight to these efforts.40
Casner’s effort to use the Restatement as a vehicle for
landlord-tenant reform proved to be highly controversial. The
advisory committee included a number of practicing lawyers
who specialized in negotiating commercial leases;41 they were
skeptical about the need for implied warranties of habitability
and rules mandating that landlords mitigate damages when
tenants abandon leaseholds.42 Casner also had to contend with
Charles J. Meyers, of Stanford Law School, who argued, following
the tenets of the nascent law and economics movement, that
mandatory tenant rights would diminish the supply of rental
units and increase prices.43
After seven years of wrangling, two volumes on
landlord-tenant law emerged in 1977. The final product
reflected a compromise between Casner and the reformers on
the one hand and the skeptics on the other. For example, the
Restatement endorsed the implied warranty of habitability, but
said it could be waived by landlords in return for consideration
ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 44:11-44:30.
Id. at 44:32-45:50; 47:13-47:55.
39 Id. at 49:15-51:01.
40 Id. at 50:25-52:02.
41 In contrast to the FIRST RESTATEMENT, which was dominated by academics,
Casner was the only academic on the landlord-tenant volumes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT ix, intro. (1977). The other committee members were
either practitioners or judges. Id.
42 See ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 52:16-53:09.
43 Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law
Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879, 893 (1975).
37
38
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provided such a waiver was not “unconscionable or significantly
against public policy.”44 As a result, the Restatement’s landlordtenant volumes did not satisfy either the reformers or the
skeptics. Overall, these volumes have had comparatively little
impact on the law.
After the landlord-tenant project was done, Casner
convinced the ALI to undertake a series of volumes on
“Donative Transfers”—essentially wills and estates.45 Again,
there was logic to this, since Bigelow’s original blueprint had
hived off trusts but implicitly left wills and estates within the
domain of property. It was no coincidence, however, that estate
planning had become the central concern of Casner’s own
scholarly efforts, while his interest in basic property law had
waned. Casner never revised the American Law of Property after
it was published in 1952-54, and no supplement was produced
after 1977.46 Instead, he devoted his scholarly energies largely to a
multi-volume treatise on estate planning.47 Once again,
Casner’s reforming impulse dictated the agenda. This time, his
initial target was the venerable Rule Against Perpetuities.
The First Restatement had considered the Rule Against
Perpetuities in Volume IV, where Powell had produced a typically
thorough restatement of the conventional understanding of the
Rule, derived from John Chipman Gray’s treatise on the subject.48
The traditional rule, as explicated by Powell and before him Gray,
was complex and a potential trap for those not advised by the
best lawyers. But it had the virtue of allowing the validity of
future interests to be determined as soon as a conveyance took
effect, because the Rule was applied by considering all possible
future contingencies (“what might happen”). Casner, prodded
by his colleague Barton Leach, was a proponent of changing the
Rule by considering what actually did happen (“wait and
see”).49 This reform had the virtue of eliminating some very
low-probability scenarios easily overlooked by lawyers (fertile
octogenarians, unborn widows, and the like), but at the price of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.6 (1977).
See ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 57:25-59:13.
46 Id., at 1:07:16-1:08:37.
47 A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING: CASES, STATUTES, TEXT, AND OTHER
MATERIALS (1st ed. 1953).
48 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1st ed. Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co.1886).
49 ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 59:19-59:55, 1:01:51-1:02:56.
Leach had long been a critic of the traditional rule, largely on the ground that it
generated unfair surprises. See, e.g., Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending
the Rule’s Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 730 (1952).
44
45
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creating long periods of uncertainty, which could impair the
alienability of property.
Casner’s advocacy of “wait and see” triggered an
emphatic rebuke by his former mentor Powell, in a dramatic
confrontation at the ALI annual meeting.50 The gist of the Powell
critique was that wait and see “leaves the location of who owns
what unascertainable for the entire period of the rule.”51 Others
pointed out that wait and see had been adopted by only a small
number of jurisdictions, and that no intervening change in
circumstances had occurred since 1944 that would justify
eliminating the traditional rule.52 Casner nevertheless prevailed a
year later, and “wait and see” was officially endorsed by the ALI
with the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Property:
Donative Transfers in 1983.53 The reform was eventually
adopted by a significant number of states, although more
through adoption by state legislatures of the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, rather than through judicial
revision relying on the Restatement.54 In fact, some state courts
have rejected “wait and see” on the ground that such a reform
was the province of the legislature, not the courts.55
Casner soldiered on as Reporter for another decade,
producing successive volumes on estate planning, namely powers
of appointment (1986), class gifts (Casner’s dissertation topic)
(1988), and gifts (1992).56 He made no move to fill the other gaps
in property that remained under Bigelow’s original plan.
The Casner era marked a decisive turn away from the
conception of the Restatement as a distillation of the law as it is,
to a view of the Restatement as a vehicle for laying down the law
as it should be. Something similar happened in other
Restatements in the second series, for example Prosser’s
Restatement (Second) of Torts, with its advocacy of strict products
liability.57 In an interview conducted near the end of his life,
A.L.I., 55TH ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 1978 at 250-56, 285-86 (1979).
Id. at 251.
52 E.g., id. at 258 (comments of Louis Lusky); id. at 267 (comments of
Laurence H. Eldredge).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983);
see id. at viii.
54 HELENE SHAPO ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 214, at n.28 (2011).
55 E.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 808
(N.Y. 1996).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, div. II, pt. V
(1986) (Powers of Appointment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS, div. II, pt. VI (1988) (Class Gifts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS, div. III (1992) (Requirements for Effectuating a Donative Transfer).
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
50
51
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Casner forthrightly defended the conception of the Restatement
as an instrument of legal reform.58 He acknowledged that it was
difficult to draw the line between restatement-style reform, which
implicitly invites the judiciary to change the law, and reform
produced by promulgating uniform laws, which target the
legislature as the appropriate instrument of legal change.59 But
Casner betrayed no doubt about the propriety of asking
committees of lawyers, headed by law professors, to agitate for
legal reform under the guise of “restating” the law.
Epistemological modesty was not part of his makeup.
When the ALI decided to launch a third series of
property restatements, it abandoned the practice of appointing
a single reporter to oversee the effort. Instead, the ALI decided
that henceforth it would appoint different reporters to head up
different topics within the field of property. This approach
recognized the reality that a single reporter was unlikely to have
the time and energy, not to mention the expertise, to oversee a
vast area like property (especially as staked out by Bigelow). Both
Powell and Casner, in their different ways, had settled on discrete
areas within the field of property that reflected their own
research interests, without venturing into more unfamiliar
territory. Nevertheless, the appointment of specialists to oversee
particular topics probably accentuated the trend toward using the
Restatements as platforms for pushing reform. Specialists are
likely to have strong views about the right and wrong ways to
approach a topic, and to see their position of leadership as an
occasion to advance the right and the good.
The Third Restatement of Property would devote its
attention to three different topics. The first—mortgages—filled a
glaring gap left by the First and Second Restatements, and was
ably executed by Reporters Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman.60
The other two topics were overtly reformist. Ironically, both
sought to replow ground that had already been covered in the
First and Second Restatements of Property. In effect, the ALI, in
its zeal to advance particular conceptions of desirable legal
reform, began to cannibalize its own prior efforts at reform.
The first of the new reformist efforts was the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, published in two volumes in 2000.
The ALI had already restated servitudes, in Volume V of the First

58
59
60

ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 1:08:38-1:11:20.
Id. at 1:13:13-1:13:54.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES (1997).

694

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

Restatement, under Reporter Oliver Rundell.61 This was a
quintessential effort to restate the law as it is, with all its quirks
and curlicues. The reporter for the new servitudes project, Susan
French, and her colleagues were eager to streamline and
rationalize the law. Since most servitudes—whether they are
easements, covenants, licenses, or profits—originate in some
contractual undertaking, the new Restatement advocated the
adoption of a very contract-like conception of servitudes,
centered on the intent of the original contracting parties and
subject to standard contractual defenses like restraint of trade,
unconscionability, and violation of public policy.62 Old
requirements, like privity of estate and touch and concern,
designed to limit the promises that could be imposed on nonconsenting future owners, were unceremoniously tossed aside.63
Whatever the merits of this reconceptualization as a proposal
for legislative reform, it was apparently too radical for the
courts. To date, the courts have largely ignored the reforms
urged by the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes and have
instead continued to apply the “outmoded” common law in
determining when servitudes run with the land.64
The other reformist effort appeared under the title
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers, which appeared in volumes released between 1999
and 2011 under the leadership of Reporter Lawrence Waggoner
and Associate Reporter John Langbein.65 The reader will recall
that Casner produced four volumes under a similar title as part
of the Second Restatement of Property, the last volume of which
was released in 1992. The best explanation for the new series
of volumes is simply that the new Reporters disagreed with the
previous Reporter on a number of fronts and were eager to
advance their own preferred positions. Perhaps most strikingly,
the Third Restatement repudiated Casner’s “wait and see” reform
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, offering up yet another version

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (1944).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.2, 3.1, 3.6, 3.7 (2000).
63 Id. at ch. V, introductory note; § 3.2. As the Executive Director observed
when the volumes were released, “[t]he large ideas in this Restatement are very
different from those that governed its predecessor.” Id. at ix.
64 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1041-42 (2d ed. 2012); Note, Touch and Concern, the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122 HARV. L. REV. 938, 944-45 (2009).
65 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS (1999); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS (2003); 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS (2011).
61
62
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of the Rule Against Perpetuities.66 Under the Waggoner-Langbein
proposed reform, the Rule would prohibit any conditional gift for
the benefit of persons born more than two generations after the
transferor.67 Ironically, by the time the Third Restatement
repudiated “wait and see,” it had become the majority rule. No
state, however, had ever adopted the Waggoner-Langbein twogeneration proposal. It was offered up as a pure reform, with
no pretense of restating the law at all.68
We agree with Waggoner and Langbein that some form
of the Rule Against Perpetuities is desirable, and we agree with
their rejection of Casner’s version of the “wait and see” reform.
But the ALI is now on record as endorsing three different
versions of the Rule Against Perpetuities. This has occurred
during a period when the Rule has been abolished or severely
curtailed in many states in an effort to attract trust business.69
The idea that yet another reform of the Rule endorsed by the
ALI will staunch its evisceration by special interest legislation
is fanciful. By the time the ALI has restated itself three times,
any credibility it can claim based on expert knowledge of
existing legal authority has evaporated. Its pronouncements
will be regarded as having no more authority than proposals
for reform appearing in a law review.
This brief overview suggests that much of the failure of
the Restatement of Property can be laid to accidents of history.
Bigelow’s scoping of the project in extremely broad terms, his
resignation as Reporter before significant progress had been
made, Powell’s slow and meticulous leadership animated by his
fascination with historical obscurities, Casner’s dogged pursuit of
particular reforms at the expense of all else, the fragmentation of
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS, ch. 27, introductory note (2010). Reporter Waggoner had previously been
supportive of the wait and see approach, but had urged the adoption of a fixed number
of years as the waiting period rather than the traditional lives in being plus 21 years.
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1714, 1714 (1985).
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 27.1
68 Reporter
Waggoner has acknowledged that the new position on
perpetuities “is aspirational.” Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the Third and Final
Volume of the New Restatement of Property that Estate Planners Should Know About,
38 ACTEC L.J. 23, 42 (2012). He justifies this on the ground that perpetuities law is
“now statutory,” so “[i]f the Restatement is to be successful in shaping the law, it will
have to be through legislation.” Id. at 42-43. This ignores that perpetuities law, even if
embodied in legislation, draws on common law concepts, which in turn require judicial
interpretation. In any event, it is an acknowledgment that the Restatement has taken
on a role indistinguishable from an editorial supporting law reform.
69 Robert Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).
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authority among multiple Reporters for the third round, and the
overtly reformist rather than “restatist” aspirations of the
volumes produced in the third round—all of these factors
contributed to the production of 17 volumes that receive
relatively little attention from lawyers and scholars, and have
had little influence with the courts.70
II.

THE HOHFELDIAN FOUNDATION OF THE RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY

We have yet to consider the most interesting aspect of
the history of the Restatement of Property, namely, that it was
originally conceived as an implementation of the typology of
legal concepts introduced by a Yale Law Professor named
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Although Hohfeld wrote less than
voluminously and died at the age of 39 in 1918, his ideas had a
pronounced influence on legal scholars, especially in the interWar period. Hohfeld engaged in what today would be called
conceptual analysis. His most famous contribution was to
break apart the concept of “right” into four distinct ideas—
right, privilege, power, and immunity—each having its own
“correlate” and “opposite.”71 He also criticized the distinction
between in personam and in rem rights, arguing that all rights
pertain to relations among persons, rather than relations of
persons to things.72
Hohfeld himself can claim some credit for the formation
of the American Law Institute. He gave a speech to the ABA
annual meeting in 1914 urging the formation of an institution
devoted to clarifying and harmonizing the law.73 Although he
70 We make no attempt here to test the positive theory of “private
legislatures” put forward by Alan Schwartz and Bob Scott, which emphasizes the
informational advantages of reformers and special interest groups relative to the
general membership of such lawmaking bodies. Alan Schwarz & Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1995). Broadly
speaking, however, it is our impression that in the field of property the “reformers,” i.e.
law professors, have played a more significant role than have interest groups. The
landlord-tenant volumes may be a partial exception.
71 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913).
72 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718-33 (1917).
73 N. E. H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins
of the American Law Institute, 8 L. & HIST. REV. 55, 58-59 (1990). The address, entitled “A
Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities Awakened to the
Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day?,” is reproduced in WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 332-84 (Walter Wheeler Cook, ed., 1923).
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died before this vision was realized, some of the founders of the
ALI, most importantly William Draper Lewis, the first
Executive Director, were enamored of the notion that Hohfeld’s
“scientific” terminology might help bring greater clarity to the
law.74 Bigelow was of the same mind, having engaged in
Hohfeldian analysis in some of his previous scholarship.75
Immediately upon being appointed Reporter for the Restatement
of Property, Bigelow set about drafting a proposed Chapter 1
devoted to setting forth precise definitions of “general terms” to be
used in restating the law of property.76 That chapter tracks
Hohfeld’s conceptual analysis of fundamental legal terms so
closely it could almost be described as a Restatement of Hohfeld.77
The Hohfeldian roots of Chapter 1 were confirmed at a
meeting of the ALI Council in 1929. When a council member
remarked on the close resemblance between the definitions in
Chapter 1 and Hohfeld’s fundamental legal concepts, Bigelow
acknowledged that “[w]ith modifications we very definitely took
Mr. Hohfeld’s ideas as the basis upon which we framed these

74 G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of
Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 30 (1997). White argues that Hull
exaggerates Hohfeld’s reformist agenda, id. at 28 n.80 (contrasting N.E.H. Hull, Vital
Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an
Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910–1919, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 270 (1995)), and that
there is little to no evidence that the early restaters understood the Hohfeldian system or its
subversive implications. Id. at 29. But see also Hull, supra note 73.
75 See Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 639, 640 (1913) (citing Hohfeld); Harry A. Bigelow & J.W. Madden, Exception and
Reservation of Easements, 38 HARV. L. REV. 180, 185-88 (1924). In his famous article on
covenants, Bigelow also cites two of Hohfeld’s antecedents in analyzing rights and
privileges, Terry and Salmond. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, supra at 640
n.5, 641 nn.13-14. He did the same in an early speech on easements, Harry A. Bigelow,
Natural Easements, 9 U. ILL. L. REV. 541, 543 n.7, 544 n.8, 10 (1915). Bigelow’s discussion in
this speech suggests a familiarity with Hohfeld’s unique contributions:

First [the owner] has what are ordinarily called privileges or permissive
rights with respect to the land, i.e., he may use it as he sees fit; he may dig in
it; erect buildings on it, cultivate it, or he may let it lie idle and do nothing
with it: in fact the privileges of user of an owner of land are so varied that it
is useless to attempt to enumerate them. It will be noticed that there are no
duties on the part of other members of society correlative to these privilges
[sic], the relation of any such other member is purely negative. All that can
be said is that no right of his is violated by the landowner’s exercising any of
these privileges.
Id. at 543. Interestingly, in this passage, Bigelow recognizes that the open-ended set of
privileges is not (effectively cannot be) delineated directly. Id. He also discusses how “[i]n
addition to these privileges of user any given landowner has certain rights in the narrow
sense, i.e. legal relations that imply correlative duties on the part of other members of
society.” Id. This was before Hohfeld published his analysis of in rem rights.
76 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1 (1936).
77 Id.
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definitions.”78 Immediately after Bigelow acknowledged the
debt to Hohfeld, Lewis chimed in:
[T]he importance to the Institute of these first five Sections is very
wide. We started the Restatement of the law of Property very largely
to be sure that in the use of these terms describing fundamental
concepts of the law we were correct, and we asked the Property
group to work them out. They have done so and their conclusions are
quite a compelling force with the other Reporters.79

Lewis later added that the first chapter of Property had been
circulated to all reporters of other subjects and with the
exhortation to use the words “as Mr. Bigelow has used them in
this Tentative Draft.”80
Bigelow proceeded to offer a spirited defense of the
Restatement’s adoption of Hohfeld’s four different definitions of
“right.” He explained that “[w]hat we are trying to do is to make
as scientific an exposition as we can of the law of real property”
and that the first step in doing so was “to free ourselves from the
ambiguities and the inexactness of expression that would exist if
we did not differentiate these various meanings of the word
right.”81 A particularly telling exchange occurred when one of
the council members, a Mr. Beers, challenged the accuracy of
the definitions on the ground that there was no mention of the
idea that property “is a right against all persons, against all
the world.”82 One of Hohfeld’s views, contrary to conventional
understanding, was that rights in rem or “against the world”
could be cashed out in terms of clusters of in personam rights.83
Channeling Hohfeld, Bigelow replied that “I do not believe that
there is any such thing as a right against the world at large,
against everybody.”84 He acknowledged that one could have
identical rights against different individuals. But it is also
possible that the rights “may vary according to the man.”85 He
was adamant that, “accurately speaking,” there was “no such
78 Harry A. Bigelow & Richard R. Powell, Discussion of Property Tentative
Draft No. 1, 7 A.L.I. PROC. 199, 207 (1929). The only “modification” appears to be the
substitution of the phase “absence of right” for Hohfeld’s “no-right.” Id. at 210-11.
79 Id. at 207.
80 Id. at 209.
81 Id. at 213-14.
82 Id. at 211.
83 Specifically, he argued that “in rem” rights were better seen as “multital,”
which means a cluster of many “unital” or one-on-one right-duty pairs, whereas
“paucital” rights were clusters of few unital rights. Hohfeld, supra note 72, at 718-33.
For discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 780-89 (2001).
84 Bigelow & Powell, supra note 78, at 215.
85 Id.
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thing as a right against the world at large, or as the older
authorities said, in rem.”86 In the last analysis, he said, there is
nothing but a series of rights against various specified individuals
and ordinarily while it is accurate to say you have got a right against
everybody, against the world at large, yet when you come to the
Restatement where it becomes essential to analyze your right more
carefully, I do not want to find ourselves committed to the
proposition that there is such a thing as a right against the world at
large or against an indeterminably large number of people.87

Bigelow was arguably not entirely successful in
extirpating any reference to rights “in rem” from the first draft
of Chapter 1. The persistent Mr. Beers noted that “interests in
land” was defined as rights “against the members of society in
general not to be interfered with in respect of the land.”88 He
pointedly asked whether the latter notion was not the same as a
right “against the world at large.”89 Bigelow responded that the
phrase “against members of society in general” was intended “to
cover the meaning of the old phrase ‘in rem’ which I have
discarded.”90 He insisted, however, that “rights against members
of society in general” did not mean the same thing as rights
“universally applicable.”91 Later, the reference to ownership of
land including rights against “members of society in general”
was changed into a definition of “possessory interests in land,”
avoiding any suggestion that rights of “ownership” might entail
universal duties.92
The Hohfeldian ideas in Chapter 1 survived the skeptical
questioning by the Council. After he took over as Reporter in 1929,
Powell showed no inclination to tinker with Bigelow’s handiwork.
As published in 1936, much of Chapter 1 reads as if it were drafted
by Hohfeld himself. Consider the four opening sections:

Id.
Id.
88 Id. at 218.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 217-18. The new definition of “Possessory Interests in Land” was
modified to read: “a physical relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree
of physical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise such control as to exclude
other members of society in general from any present occupation of the land.”
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: POSSESSORY INTERESTS IN LAND § 7 (1936). Given
that ownership of land generally entails possession, or at least the right to determine
who has possession, the concession that possession entails rights against the world
would seem to imply that ownership does too.
86
87
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§ 1. Right.
A right, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a legally
enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other shall
do a given act or shall not do a given act.
Comment:
Correlative duty. * * *

§ 2. Privilege.
A privilege, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a legal
freedom on the part of one person as against another to do a given
act or a legal freedom not to do a given act.
Comment:
a.

Correlative absence of right. * * *

§ 3. Power.
A power, as the word is used in this Restatement, is an
ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a given legal
relation by doing or not doing a given act.
Comment:
a.

Correlative liability. * * *

§ 4. Immunity.
An immunity, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a freedom on
the part of one person against having a given legal relation altered by a
given act or omission to act on the part of another person.
Comment:
a.

Correlative disability. * * *93

How far the adoption of Hohfeldian terminology in chapter
1 affected the balance of the content of the original Restatement of
Property is open to question. The first two volumes of the
Restatement of Property, produced by Powell with Bigelow looking
over his shoulder, display a conscientious effort to deploy the
Hohfeldian definitions set forth in Chapter 1.94 But after
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 1-4 (1936).
One can cite any number of instances in the first volume of the
Restatement in which the Hohfeldian vocabulary is utilized. Some examples:
93
94

2014]

WHY RESTATE THE BUNDLE?

701

Chapter 1, the First Restatement quickly plunged into explicating
the various estates in land and future interests, more or less
following conventional understandings. In these provisions it is
difficult to discern any substantive impact associated with the use
of Hohfeldian terminology, whether it achieved any clarifying
effect or not.
Whatever its impact on the First Restatement of
Property, the hopes of Executive Director Lewis that Chapter 1
of the Restatement of Property would serve as a template for
the adoption of a consistent “scientific” terminology throughout
all Restatements were not realized. In 1933, George Farnum,
himself an enthusiastic proponent of Hohfeldian terminology,
undertook an analysis of the emerging work product of the ALI
with a view to determining whether Hohfeldian language was
being adopted consistently.95 Farnum gave high marks to the
Restatement of Property and to the Restatement of Business
Associations, where Lewis himself was serving as Reporter.96

§ 24. Condition Subsequent.
The term “condition subsequent” denotes that part of the language of a
conveyance, by virtue of which upon the occurrence of a stated event the
conveyor, or his successor in interest, has the power to terminate the interest
which has been created subject to the condition subsequent, but which will
continue until this power is exercised.
....
§ 49. Privilege to Use the Affected Land.
The privilege of the owner of a possessory estate in fee simple defeasible
to use the land is identical with that of an owner of a possessory estate in fee
simple absolute, except that the privilege is limited by a duty not to commit
waste.
....
§ 53. Liability to Condemnation.
The liability of an owner of an estate in fee simple defeasible to have his
interest taken under eminent domain proceedings is identical with that of an
owner of a estate in fee simple absolute.
....
§ 147. Liability to Creditors
Except as modified by the rules of law of trusts, a creditor of a person
who has an estate for life has the power to subject such estate to the payment
of his claim. The owner of an estate for life has a liability corresponding to
this power.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 24, 49, 53, 147 (1936).
95 George R. Farnum, Terminology and the American Law Institute, 13 B.U.
L. REV. 203, 208-09 (1933).
96 Id. at 211.
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With respect to the Restatement of Contracts, Farnum
identified inconsistencies, especially with respect to the use of
the term “liability.”97 He attributed this to the fact that
Contracts was a collaboration between Reporter Samuel
Williston, a Hohfeldian skeptic, and Special Advisor Arthur
Corbin, an enthusiast.98 The Restatement of Trusts, under the
leadership of Austin Scott, was disappointing. “It is difficult to
detect any pronounced trace of Hohfeld’s influence.”99 The
Restatement of Agency was a project in which Farnum thought
“the Hohfeldian terminology could be utilized to particular
advantage.”100 Nevertheless, the original Reporter, Floyd
Mechem, was indifferent to Hohfeld, and his replacement,
Warren Seavey, had made only modest efforts to redress this
deficiency.101 The Reporter for the Restatement of Torts, Francis
Bohlen, was openly critical of Hohfeld, and insisted on using
terms “quite at odds with their Hohfeldian definition.”102 As for
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, under the direction of
Reporter Joseph Beale, the influence of Hohfeld “is nowhere
apparent.”103 All this was deeply disappointing to Farnum, who
identified the work of the ALI as the “arena in which the
decisive battle over the practical value of the Hohfeldian
terminology seems to be in progress.”104
Farnum’s analysis shows that the attempt to impose
Hohfeldian language on the restatement project as a whole
never got off the ground. There were too many strong-willed
reporters who had their own ideas, and Lewis had insufficient
leverage to insist they rewrite their work product to incorporate
an uncongenial vocabulary. As Lewis was forced to concede in a
Council discussion on the initial draft of the Restatement of
Conflicts of Laws, “there was no insistence on a uniform legal
terminology throughout all the Restatements.”105
Not surprisingly, Hohfeldian terminology did not even
survive within the Restatement of Property. Powell felt an
obligation to adhere to Bigelow’s effort to prescribe Hohfeldian
Id. at 213.
Id. at 212-13. For Corbin’s enthusiasm, see Arthur L. Corbin, Forward, in
HOHFELD, supra note 73.
99 Farnum, supra note 95, at 214.
100 Id. at 215.
101 Id. at 215-16.
102 Id. at 216.
103 Id. at 217.
104 Id. at 208.
105 Id. at 209 (citing Formal statement of Director, Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 26 (1934)).
97
98
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definitions in the First Restatement. But Casner had no interest
in Hohfeld, nor did any of his successors as Reporters for the
Third Restatement. Consider, for example, the following from the
Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers (1983):
§ 5.1 Basis for Determining Validity of Restraints on
Personal Conduct.
Unless contrary to public policy or violative of some rule of law, a
provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent the
acquisition or retention of an interest in property in the event of any
failure on the part of the transferee to comply with a restraint on
personal conduct is valid.106

If a Hohfeldian had written this section, it would speak
in terms of powers and liabilities, but these terms do not
appear. By the time we get to the Third Restatement, the
deviations are even more striking. This is taken from
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes:
§ 2.18 Acquisition of Servitudes by Governmental
Bodies and the Public . . .
(2) Unless application of the rules set forth in 4.1 through 4.2 leads
to a different conclusion as to the intention of the parties creating a
servitude, the right to control a servitude for the benefit of the public
is located in the state and the right to use the servitude benefit
extends to the public at large.107

Note that “right” is used the first time in the sense of a
Hohfeldian “power,” and is used the second time in the sense of
a Hohfedian “privilege.” In others words, the Restatement was
guilty of the core ambiguity in the use of terms that Hohfeld
sought to extirpate. Hohfeld would be turning over in his grave.
In short, the campaign launched by Lewis and Bigelow
to have the entire restatement project conform to Hohfeldian
terminology survived into the First Restatement of Property and
the Restatement of Business Associations. But otherwise, it
quickly fell apart. It was too much to expect lawyers to begin
speaking in a different language.108
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (1983).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.18 (2000).
108 This was recognized at the time. See William R. Vance, The Restatement of
the Law of Property, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1937) (“The use of the Hohfeld
terminology is greatly helpful in stating specific problems that require nice analysis,
but it is not suited to descriptive or expository writing addressed to even such a
specialized portion of the public as the members of the bar and the bench. Lawyers and
106
107
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THE RESTATEMENT AND THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS

The fact that Hohfeld’s peculiar terminology failed to
catch on across the entire ALI project, and that it soon died
even within the confines of the Restatement of Property, does
not mean that Hohfeld’s influence, or the climate of opinion that
allowed so many to embrace his prescriptions with such
enthusiasm, did not have a profound impact on the Restatement of
Property. Although Hohfeld never used the expression “bundle of
rights” to describe property, his writings on property clearly
presupposed a conception of property that came to be summarized
by the bundle metaphor. Property in a Hohfeldian world consists
of various packages of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities,
with their correlates and opposites. Precision is important in
delineating the elements in each package. But, by implication,
there is no limit on the way in which the elements can be
combined—or recombined if recombination is thought to be
appropriate. Similarly, Hohfeld thought there was no such
thing as a right good against the world. All packages of
property could be reduced to combinations of elements good as
between individual persons.109 So viewed, there is no inherent
structure or architecture to property.110 Each set of circumstances
is governed by a unique combination of elements, which can be
modified as perceptions of public policy evolve. Hohfeld’s view of
property was effectively what a later generation would call the
“bundle of rights” or “bundle of sticks.”
The first Reporter of Property, Harry Bigelow, fully
assimilated and embraced this view of property. In his 1926
memo, for example, Bigelow illustrated the concept of property
by instancing A’s ownership of a farm:
Legally this means the following: A has with regard to that
particular piece of soil an indefinitely large number of interests: that
his neighbors shall not look at it, flood it by turning water on it, or
walk across it; to cultivate it in certain ways; to raise money by
giving another person legal rights in it; to dispose of all legal rights
in it. His first interest the law does not protect, the second it protects
with qualifications, the third it protects almost completely, and so on

judges do not in fact understand the Hohfeld system, and one suspects that even the
restaters have their difficulties with it . . . .” (footnote omitted) (documenting mistakes
in the use of Hohfeld’s terminology in the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY)).
109 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, supra note 83, at 786 (“Hohfeld conceived of in rem rights as a kind of cluster
bomb of actual and potential in personam rights.”).
110 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691,
1692 (2012).
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with others, by giving him various kinds of rights, in the broad
sense. These rights, in the broad sense, may be grouped under
various headings such as right as correlative to duty, powers,
privileges, etc. The aggregate of these rights with respect to the soil
constitute A’s property with regard thereto. That is, property is a
collective word denoting the totality of A’s rights with regard to his
land . . . . Each individual right that A has in the land may be
properly spoken of as a property right. When a person has the
totality of rights with regard to soil that the law creates we have the
norm of property, or complete ownership.111

Although Bigelow in this passage does not expressly adopt the
metaphor of the “bundle of rights,” one could not ask for a
clearer expression of the “bundle” view of property, complete
with references to Hohfeldian terminology (“right as correlative
to duty, powers, privileges, etc.”).112 Ownership of a farm can be
cashed out in terms of “an indefinitely large number of
interests.”113 Some of these the law protects; some it does not. The
totality of the interests protected by law constitutes the “norm of
property.”114 Bigelow clearly embraced the extreme nominalism
about the concept of property associated with the bundle
metaphor.
The same conception of property was formally adopted in
Chapter 1 of the Restatement, albeit in a somewhat cryptic
fashion. Recall that sections 1-4 of Chapter 1 set forth the
definitions of “right,” “privilege,” “power,” and “immunity,” more
or less taken straight from Hohfeld. Section 5 then provides:
§ 5. Interest.
The word “interest” is used in this Restatement both generically to
include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and
immunities and distributively to mean any one of them. * * * 115

This generic concept of “interest” is then picked up again in
Section 10, which defines “owner”:
§ 10. Owner.
The word “owner,” as it is used in this Restatement, means the
person who has one or more interests.116

111
112
113
114
115
116

Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936).
Id. at § 10.
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“Ownership,” in other words, refers to nothing other than the
collective bundle of “interests”—that is, rights, privileges, powers,
and immunities—which attach to a particular person. In fact, the
Restatement is even more nominalist about property than
Bigelow had been in his 1926 memo. There, you will recall,
property was defined as interests of a person with respect to a
thing. In the text of the Restatement, the “thing” disappears.
Ownership refers to a collective of interests of a person. Taken
literally, there is no difference between “property” and other
legal relations. “Property” is just an empty vessel, into which
any collection of “interests” of persons can be poured.
We do not mean to overstate the causal connection between
the bundle of rights conception of property and the various failings
of the Restatement of Property. Just as the various Hohfeldian
definitions in Chapter 1 were quickly forgotten, so was the
definition of ownership as a collection of interests.
Nevertheless, the underlying conception of property as a
bundle of rights was given a decisive boost by the ALI’s
endorsement, and quickly became a kind of American
orthodoxy.117 The bundle was congenial to a variety of actors. It
was consistent with the perspective of legal formalists like Powell,
who thought law could be described as a system of rules, because
it implied that there could be a different rule for each situation. It
appealed to progressive/sociological reformers like Lewis and
Bigelow who wanted to rationalize the law to make it conform
more closely to what they perceived to be the public interest. It
was embraced by the Legal Realists, of whom Casner was
perhaps an unconscious disciple, who wanted to expand public
regulation of property without any concern for constitutional
protections of property. And it was adopted by law and economics
scholars, who preferred to analyze property disputes in terms of
contractual models (transaction costs) or tort models (cost
internalization).118 To all these proponents, the bundle model was
appealing because it purported to be scientifically sophisticated
117 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
26-29 (1977); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII:
PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). More recently the
bundle picture has been challenged from feminist, Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix
Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV.
239, 241 (1994), philosophical, J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property,
43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 737 (1996), and economic, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001),
perspectives. For a debate on the bundle picture, see Symposium: Property: A Bundle of
Rights?, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 193 (2011), available at http://econjwatch.org/issues/
volume-8-issue-3-september-2011.
118 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 117, at 375.
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and oriented to real world detail, but otherwise imposed no
constraints on their aspirations.
Although there is no direct causal link between the
bundle of rights metaphor and the failure of the Restatement of
Property, we think the embrace of the bundle idea by the founding
generation of the restatement enterprise, and its unquestioning
acceptance by succeeding generations of reporters, made that
failure more likely. If property is just a bundle of rights, with no
inherent structure, then one can start anywhere one wants in a
Restatement. One can start with what is familiar from the
classroom (the estate system), or one can start with the issue
du jour (landlord-tenant law). In effect, the bundle allows one
to avoid choices on what to cover.
The bundle also disavows any connecting threads among
different issues in property. This too facilitates piecemeal
restating. By implying that property is an ever-mutating
institution, the bundle also reduces the incentive to provide a
complete restatement of property. To the contrary, it makes it
more likely that the enterprise will gravitate toward the pet
projects of whoever happens to be in control of the process at
any point in time.
Finally and most critically, a Restatement of Property
built on the sands of the bundle concept is unlikely to have a
great deal to say of sustaining interest or value. It is little
wonder that a Restatement built on this foundation has seen
relatively little use, and has had relatively limited influence.
CONCLUSION
Despite the many volumes appearing under the title
“Restatement of Property,” property has never really been
restated. In a grand irony, the project that through its adoption of
Hohfeldian terminology was supposed to provide the undergirding
for the rest of the Restatements was never finished. We have
argued that the choice of Hohfeldian framework, interpreted as
the bundle of rights—with its atomized legal relations and its
reductionist approach to in rem rights—contributed to the
shortcomings of the Restatement of Property. The bundle picture
was fully compatible with progressive aspirations, the
postponement of major areas and difficult issues, and the
piecemeal treatment of whichever topics suit the fancy of reporters
and reformers. Indeed, it was compatible with anything. Because
the main lesson of the bundle of rights picture of property is that
property is a collection of interests and property law is a collection
of individual policy-driven rules, a comprehensive restatement that

708

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

reflected the architecture of property was not felt as a compelling
need—the bundle denied the very existence of any such
architecture. There is little reason to restate the bundle, and, if
property is a bundle, little reason to restate the law of property.
Would it be possible at this late date to return to
Bigelow’s original plan, appoint a new cadre of reporters,
instruct them to stick to restating the law without advocating
sweeping reforms, and produce, at long last, a complete
Restatement of Property? We doubt it. Such a Restatement would
be truly valuable only if animated by a shared conception of an
imminent architecture in the law of property. We happen to
believe there is such an architecture, grounded in a basic
commitment to owners’ exclusion rights, modified by select
governance regimes that respond to problems generated in part
by transaction costs. But there is no universal agreement about
this. The cadre of reporters selected to implement the plan
would likely go off in all directions, pursuing different
hobbyhorses, just as their predecessors did. Moreover, many of
the areas in Bigelow’s plan that have remained untouched,
including security interests and their many offshoots in the
form of derivatives, not to mention intellectual property rights,
have become immensely complex and contested, which would
further compromise any attempt at comprehensive treatment.
Finally, we think the animating vision of the original
Restatement project—which emphasized the improvements
that could be brought about by rationalizing, simplifying, and
eliminating conflict in the common law—has largely vanished
from the ranks of the American professoriate. The vision of the
law as political struggle, with competing ideologies and interests
seeking dominance in any available forum, is widespread
enough that a new group of restaters would likely not rest
content with restating the law, but would seek to remake it in
accordance with their own views. If so, there is little reason to
think that a new Restatement would avoid the failings of the old.

